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Introduction 
 
The international system is complex. It might be seen as a constellation of states 
interacting with one another. Or, it might be a macro-level social interaction involving 
actors at multiple levels: the individual decision makers, the bureaucracy, and the 
interest groups. Given that humans are involved—both individually and 
collectively—in international politics, analysis at various social levels needs to be 
considered, just as these factors are important in explaining social life in general. 
 So far, we have seen the historical evolution of global politics (Chapter 1), 
along with the various theories that seek to explain international politics (Chapter 2). 
Now we will analyze the complexities of the 
international system. One useful ‘tool’ for doing this 
is the levels of analysis approach,  seeking to divide 
complex international politics into smaller, bite-sized, 
‘chunks’. The levels of analysis tell several ‘stories’ 
about the way the international system works. For 
instance, the approach allows us to appreciate the 
various interactions between and among the individuals and the larger political 
environment. It also equips us with a framework for analyzing the interplay between 
domestic- and international factors. In short, the levels of analysis provide stories 
about the way the world ‘works’. This Chapter starts out with the discussion of the 
stories told by the levels of analysis approach. Then we explore other stories people 
tell about the way the international system ‘works’. The aim of this Chapter is to show 
Levels of analysis: ways 
of analyzing how foreign 
policy decisions are made 
at various levels of the 
state—individual policy 
maker; the bureaucracy; 
or the state as a collective. 
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that there are many stories out there, and as students of International Relations (IR), 
we need to be mindful of the benefits and disadvantages of such stories. 
 
 
The Levels of Analysis: Stories We Tell 
 
One useful, conceptual, tool in analyzing international politics is the levels of analysis 
approach. As the name suggests, we divide the complex reality of international 
politics into smaller chunks—or ‘levels’—so that studying it becomes easier, enabling 
us to determine what decisions are made by whom, and under what constraints. As 
such, the issue is partly methodological: how we might go about exploring 
international affairs. Frederick Frey (1985: 127) makes an important point when he 
says that, 
 
Politics and political science [including IR] are indubitably about people, but 
in rather special sense, not in the most common intuitive sense. Political 
science usually does not deal with people in either their individuality or their 
totality. 
 
Hence, it is the notion of actor 
designation that lies at the heart of 
the levels of analysis approach: 
designating ‘actors’—whether be it 
individuals, the bureaucracy, or the 
state—at various overlapping levels that effect an outcome on the international stage. 
As Frey (1985: 147) notes, this actor designation, ‘though largely taken for granted, is 
a crucial feature of political analysis’. This is also the case in IR: who our actors will 
determine what we can discuss, and how. 
 One approach is to follow the Three Images identified by Kenneth Waltz. He 
suggests that there are three levels of analysis that can be utilized in the study of how 
wars occur. In the First Image, the assumption is that the egotistical human nature 
causes wars. This level of analysis suggests that we do not need to go further than the 
personal attributes of policy makers to appreciate the causes of wars. Waltz (1959: 16) 
argues that, 
 
Actor designation: deciding who/what 
the main focus of analysis is going to 
be. 
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According to the first image of international relations, the locus of the 
important causes of war is found in the nature and behaviour of man. Wars 
result from selfishness, from misdirected impulses, from stupidity. 
 
Therefore, the First Image provides us with one level of analysis: in order to 
appreciate international events, we need to look at individuals. 
 The Second Image, on the other hand, focuses on the internal constitution of 
the state, such as its ideological underpinnings. Arguments such as whether or not 
democracies are more peaceful than autocratic states determine the way we explain 
international events. Waltz (1959: 81) points out that, 
 
One explanation of the second-image type is illustrated as follows. War most 
often promotes the internal unity of each state involved. The state plagued by 
internal strife may then, instead of waiting for accidental attack, seek the war 
that will bring internal peace. 
 
Thus, we see a shift from an individual level to a more collective level. Yet, as we 
move onto the Third Image, we go ‘up’ another level: the anarchic nature of the 
international system. Waltz (1959: 159) argues that, 
 
With many sovereign states, with no system of law enforceable among them, 
with each state judging its grievances and ambition according to the dictates of 
its own reason or desire—conflict, sometimes leading to war, is bound to 
occur. 
 
At this level, the main concern is less to do with who the actors are, as it is to do with 
how the international system is structured. Waltz himself is sympathetic towards the 
Third Image, and the story he tells about the way the international system ‘works’ will 
be discussed later. 
Waltz’s Three Images: 
 
• First Image: human behaviour (Waltz, 1959: Chapter 2); 
• Second Image: the internal structure of states (Waltz, 1959: Chapter 
4); and 
• Third Image: international anarchy; or the constraints of the 
international system (Waltz, 1959: Chapter 6). 
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 In a similar vein to Waltz, Robert Jervis (1976: 16-17) argues that perceptions 
and misperceptions that drive international political dynamics need to be studied with 
the above levels in mind. He posits that, in order for us to explain how international 
actors make decisions, we need to be mindful of the interplay of international-, 
national-, and bureaucratic levels; and deciding on which level ‘is the most important 
may be determined by how rich and detailed an answer we are seeking’. Similarly, in 
order for us to fully understand the factors involved in foreign policy decision making, 
Graham Allison (1971) argues that we need to move back and forth between and 
among the various levels: the state as a whole; bureaucracies and their constraints; as 
well as politics between and among the individuals within government. 
 
 Hence, paying attention to multiple levels is beneficial, as it makes it easier for 
us to understand the complexities of the international system. However, there are 
several issues with the levels of analysis approach. Are individuals really bad, as in 
the First Image? How then can we explain international cooperation (Waltz, 1959: 
28)? And do states sharing an ideology apt to be peaceful to one another, just as the 
Second Image might predict (Waltz, 1959: 121)? Also, is it really the case that 
Levels of Analysis in US Foreign Policy towards the Middle East 
 
When exploring the US policies towards the Middle East, there are various 
levels from which we can explore the topic, including: 
 
• The personal ‘chemistry’ between the US president and the prime 
minister of Israel; 
• The effects of Jewish lobby on US politics; 
• The politics of United Nations (UN)—particularly the UN Security 
Council—in determining whether or not to sanction Syria; and 
• Perceptions and misperceptions in US-Iranian diplomatic relations (The 
Economist, 15 December 2012: 48-49). 
 
While discussing US policies towards the entire Middle East would lack focus, 
dividing them up into pieces allows us to make a better sense of what is 
happening. 
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democracies do not fight one another? Bruce Russett (2009) argues that the findings 
are inconclusive, suggesting that we need to pay close attention to other systemic 
factors—just as in the Third Image. 
 
 
Telling Stories about the International System 
 
The Three Images, as well as other iterations of the levels of analysis, provide us with 
a useful tool for analyzing international politics, but how about the international 
system itself? We need to bear in mind that the international system itself is usually 
one of the three levels of analysis. Each level of analysis can be construed as stories 
people tell about decision making, instances of war, and other aspects of international 
politics in general. Indeed, this is what many IR theorists do (see Chapter 2). Just as in 
the levels of analysis approach, we can start telling stories about the international 
system, taking into consideration different actors, focal points, and concerns. 
Therefore, we can also tell stories about the international system: some stories are 
more amenable towards the levels of analysis approach, while other stories are less so. 
But just as the levels of analysis provide us with a variety of explanations about 
international affairs, the following stories also provide us with multiple explanations 
of the international system.  
 
 
Story One: The Homo Economicus View of the International System 
 
The first story is that of the 
Homo Economicus view of 
the international system. By 
Homo Economicus, we mean 
a rational actor whose sole 
interest lies in the 
maximization of her 
wellbeing. This is the view that is most prevalent in Economics and Business Studies, 
but traditional IR theories, such as Neorealism and Neoliberal-Institutionalism, also 
Homo Economicus: A philosophical depiction 
of humans as benefit-maximizers. In 
Economics, it means that humans and 
corporations seek to maximize profit; while in 
IR, it indicates that states are in constant 
struggle to maximize power. 
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follow this approach. Similar to economic presumptions about the actors and what 
they do, this particular story makes the following assumptions: 
 
• Actors are rational, meaning they are capable of making informed decisions 
when faced with choices; and 
• Actors are unitary, meaning that the proponents of this story are concerned 
less with what happens inside a state, than what happens when a state 
collectively formulates a policy. In other words, what goes on inside the state 
is often left out of the story. 
 
So, when economists discuss the behaviour of corporations, they are primarily 
concerned about how companies make decisions as though they are individuals. 
Similarly, some IR theorists consider main actors to be states coping in an anarchical 
international system, with Waltz being one of the main proponents of this story. In his 
seminal book, Theory of International Politics, he draws lessons from Economics to 
make the point that international politics needs to be studied in the way economists 
analyze the economy. For him, domestic factors might be important; but systemic 
factors play an even more crucial role, such that the focus should be firmly on the 
behaviour of states as unitary, rational, actors, rather than what goes on inside them 
(Waltz, 1979: 62-63). 
 Therefore, this story makes several working assumptions about how the 
international system ‘works’: 
 
• Actors in this story refer solely to states. While Neorealists recognize other 
potential actors on the international stage, given that it is the states who enjoy 
legitimate monopoly of violence, non-state actors such as Multinational 
Corporations (MNCs) become less significant. 
• As mentioned above, states are considered as unitary actors, meaning they are 
to be treated as ‘things’. Again, while Neorealists recognize the role of groups, 
such as bureaucracies and interest groups; as well as those of charismatic 
individuals, such as John Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 
1962, these factors are considered less significant. 
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• This story also takes for granted that the international system is anarchic, 
meaning there is no world government or world police. While ‘anarchy’ 
sounds as if the international system is chaotic, it does not have to be so. 
 
Thus, this story provides a very simplified view of the international system. As Waltz 
(1979: 9) argues, the main task is to construct a model of reality, not the reality. For 
Neorealists, this simplicity is the primary strength of this story. 
 In order for states to guarantee their own survival, the Neorealists think that 
states are constantly seeking to maximize their power. Power in this case is defined as 
the ability to influence others. This includes physical ability to influence your 
opponent’s thinking, such as possessing nuclear weapons; or it could be psychological 
power—the ability to change others’ thinking without any physical or financial outlay 
on your part (Morgenthau, 1985: Chapter 1). The result is a constant competition for 
survival. Accordingly, cooperation between and among actors might happen; but the 
fear of someone reneging on promises is too great, to the extent that there is a 
constant fear of war. And if everyone in the international system thinks this, the 
logical conclusion is that wars can happen at any moment. John Mearsheimer (1995) 
warns us that, just because the European Union (EU) provides a forum for member 
states to negotiate their national interests, the EU is not a world government, nor is it 
an international police force. As such, Mearsheimer argues that EU cannot prevent 
war in Europe—if it ever comes to that. This pessimism is the hallmark of this 
particular story. The vision of the international system resembles a billiard table, 
where billiard balls collide and react against one another. 
 Waltz (1959: 227) suggests that, 
 
According to this [thinking], there is a constant possibility of war in a world in 
which there are two or more states each seeking to promote a set of interests 
and having no agency above them upon which they can rely for protection. 
 
This is because the ‘state in the world are like individuals in the state of nature. They 
are neither perfectly good nor are they controlled by law’ (Waltz, 1959: 163). At this 
level of analysis, the anarchic nature of the international system begins to resemble 
Rousseau’s ‘stag hunt’. This is a hypothetical situation in which five hungry men 
agree to cooperate in a joint endeavour to catch a stag. When the five slowly approach 
the target, one man sees a hare. Because he is hungry, he jumps for it—after all, there 
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is no guarantee that the five can capture the stag, and he thinks that he has a good 
chance of catching the hare for food. As a result, the stag escapes. The lesson here is 
this: under anarchic conditions, cooperation becomes difficult (Waltz, 1959: 167-68). 
Such a way of thinking provides the justification for this story: what is at stake is the 
way unitary state actors interact with one another. Using the stag hunt analogy, while 
what might be happening inside each man’s head might be salient, what is more 
important is what happens when individuals decide to act to maximize their 
interests—in this case, satisfying their hunger, and therefore, the urge to survive. 
This is the basic framework that the Neorealists use to analyze the way the 
international system works. It is the anarchic structure of the international system that 
makes it difficult for state actors to see beyond their own, individual, self interests (= 
survival). In short, wars occur because there is nothing to prevent them from 
happening (Waltz, 1959: 232). The proponents of this story think it a waste of 
resources to hope that cooperation can take place, especially if there is a real danger 
of your friend turning into your enemy at some point. The flip-side of this argument is 
that cooperation is seen as a rare mutual coincidence of wants, though there is no 
guarantee that it can be sustained. The proponents of this story assume that the 
possibility of conflict is always there, and postulate that actors are constantly 
preparing for such an event. 
 
 
The Critique 
 
As you can see, the lack of insight into domestic actors, coupled with the assumption 
that national interests of state actors are predefined in terms of maximizing power 
means that this level of analysis takes an overtly top-down, holistic, view. The state 
actors are effectively ‘black boxed’ in this story to the extent that they are almost like 
atoms engaged in some form of a chain reaction. Despite what we might read in the 
newspapers—such as the preferences of US presidents colliding with those of the 
Congress in many American foreign policy areas including China, Iran, and 
international trade—these factors are recognized and yet trivialized. This story 
provides a very simplified and accessible model of the international system; but it 
prevents us from asking questions such as the role of domestic coalition patterns in 
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the formulation of foreign policies, as is usually the case in European states; or the 
role of religion in Iranian foreign policy, or the ideological- and historical dimensions 
of Chinese foreign relations. 
 To be sure, this story provides an entry-level analysis into the study of 
international politics. This story is exactly the sort of description of the international 
system that we are familiar with in media reporting. Yet, there is no escaping that the 
black boxing of 
states leaves many 
questions 
unanswered. The 
more we think about 
what makes states 
act in the way they do; and the more we wonder about what motivates presidents and 
prime ministers to make decisions that they make, we need to start plying into the 
black box of states. This story necessarily provides a macroscopic view of the 
international system. It is a good start, but it begs more questions than it answers. 
  
 
Story Two: Power, Cooperation, Norms, and Interdependence 
 
The previous story on the international system focused primarily on the system-level 
analysis. That is, state- and bureaucratic levels were deemed to be less important in 
understanding how the world ‘works’. In that story, wars occur because there is 
nothing to prevent them from happening. We now move onto another story which 
shares similar assumptions about the anarchic nature of the international system, but 
takes on a less pessimistic outlook compared to Neorealists. This story is often told by 
Neoliberal-Institutionalists (see Chapter 2). 
 
 
The Role of Institutions 
 
The proponents of this story take international institutions very seriously. Here, 
‘institutions’ include international organizations like the UN and the EU. While there 
Black boxing of states: an assumption that considers 
states to be unitary actors; and that only their foreign 
policy outcomes matter in international politics. As 
such, only a cursory attention is given to domestic 
politics. This is an approach favoured by Neorealists 
and Neoliberal-Institutionalists. 
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are various discussions on the different meanings attached to terms such as 
‘institutions’, ‘regimes’, and ‘organizations’, for the purposes of this chapter, we use 
them interchangeably (Hasenclever, et al., 1997: Chapter 2). 
 According to Stephen Krasner (quoted in Keohane, 1982: 341-42), institutions 
embody ‘principles (“beliefs of fact, causation, 
and rectitude”) and norms (“standards of 
behavior defined in terms of rights and 
obligations”) as well as rules and decision 
making procedures’. Unlike the pessimism of 
Neorealism, this story is optimistic that actors 
are able to realize the longer-term benefits of 
cooperation. This is in stark contrast to 
Neorealists who consider international cooperation to be a mere coincidence. A very 
good example might be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): the Cold 
War has ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union; but NATO has found new 
raison d’etre in Kosovo and Afghanistan, for instance. Now, this does not mean that 
the proponents of this story consider international institutions to be a panacea. They 
do consider actors to be rational egotists who are ‘hard-wired’ into making cost-
benefit calculations. Indeed, Robert Keohane (1984: 73) argues that, ‘although 
international regimes may be valuable to their creators, they do not necessarily 
improve world welfare. They are not ipso facto “good”’. Yet, they also question the 
pessimism of Neorealism. Keohane (1984: 7) states that, ‘[i]f international politics 
were a state of war, institutionalized patterns of cooperation on the basis of shared 
purposes should not exist except as part of a large struggle for power’. For Keohane 
(1984: 51-52; emphases deleted), ‘intergovernmental cooperation takes place when 
the policies actually followed by one government are regarded by its partners as 
facilitating realization of their own objectives, as the result of a process of policy 
coordination’. Hence, this story suggest that states are also capable of looking at the 
longer term benefits, as compared to the assumption that actors are short-termist, as in 
the stag hunt example. Hence, the Neoliberals see the international system as 
potentially a billiard ball model, but consider that international institutions can 
ameliorate some of the worst excesses of international anarchy. It is precisely because 
the states are rational actors that they create international regimes as a way to 
‘establish stable mutual expectation about others’ patters of behaviour and to develop 
International institution: 
set of rules and norms for 
international behaviour. Can 
be both formal (e.g., the 
UN) and informal (the so-
called ‘special relationship’ 
between the US and the 
UK). 
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working relationships that will allow the parties to adapt their practices to new 
structures’ (Keohane, 1982: 331). One factor that makes this possible in the eyes of 
the Neoliberals is the existence of norms—‘standards of behaviour defined in terms of 
rights and obligations’ (Keohane, 1984: 57). Neoliberal-Institutionalists allege that 
international regimes are akin to international ‘market’ for national interests: once the 
state actors agree to enter into that ‘market’, they are socialized into the particular 
ways of behaviour expected of them in that context. Through such a process, a notion 
of reciprocity emerges through which participants come to expect how others will act 
within that particular context (Hasenclever, et al., 1997: 9-10). 
This way of thinking potentially opens up the level of analysis to include non-
state actors, such as MNCs with enough economic clout to become a significant 
player on the world stage. Once cooperation is understood as sustainable, and not just 
a coincidence, then other entities can be granted actorhood. If war is seen as almost a 
default position within the international system, then state actors are the only entities 
capable of exerting influence. However, if a story allows for the institutionalization of 
cooperative behaviours, then other entities become more visible, due to their influence 
on the world stage. The global financial crisis following the Lehman Shock of 
September 2008 is a case in point: the idea that some banks are ‘too big to fail’ gains 
potency because they are recognized as powerful actors in the international system, 
either because their failures can precipitate a financial contagion; or because the 
governments are heavily dependent on these banks to underwrite their debts. 
 Hence, this story is much more complex than the previous one, simply because 
there are more vectors of interaction between and among the state- and non-state 
actors. To be sure, some Neorealists such as Robert Gilpin (1987) recognize that non-
state actors might play an important role, but they also suggest that states tramp non-
state actors. But, the complexity of the Neoliberal story makes an important move in 
the levels of analysis, because of the 
shift down from Waltz’s Third Image 
down towards the Second Image, if not 
the First Image. The potentials for 
complex interactions between and 
among the various actors and the 
recognition that both politics and 
Complex interdependence: an 
idea in which the international 
system is comprised of states and 
non-state actors interacting 
cooperatively (especially 
economically), while maintaining a 
semblance of balance of power 
(especially militarily) (Nye and 
Keohane, 1977). 
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economics play crucial roles in the way the international system works gives rise to 
the notion of complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1977). Furthermore, 
firmly within the First Image is another derivation of this story, introducing the notion 
of policy entrepreneurs—individuals who are charismatic and instrumental in 
bringing about change. These policy entrepreneurs provide convincing arguments and 
ideas that can influence the course of international outcomes, such as the negotiations 
leading up to the evolution of the EU in the 1980s and the 1990s (Moravcsik, 1999). 
Hence, the variations of the second story allow proponents to construct a variety of 
models that help explain the complex workings of the international system—not 
something that is possible with the inherent simplicity of Neorealism. 
 
 
The Critique 
 
This story is more complex than the first story: the decision to take international 
cooperation seriously opens the way for discussions on international institutions, as 
well as potentials to recognize other actors in the international arena, including MNCs 
and individuals. It is a story not just of balance of power but one of power and 
interdependence in which rational actors at various levels of analysis engage in rivalry 
as well as cooperation. As such, we are beginning to move away from solely focusing 
on Waltz’s Third Image of international relations, but gradually allowing us to 
explore Second- and First Images. It also allows us to engage better with Allison’s 
three levels of foreign policy analysis in which decisions made at individual-, group-, 
and state levels can all impact on the workings of the international system. The model 
here is more complex, and are therefore more difficult to conceptualize than 
Neorealism; but it also allows us to appreciate the interplay of various forces that are 
behind world affairs (see Chapters 6 and 7). 
 However, it is also the case that this story shares some of the problems of the 
previous one. On the one hand, this story holds potentials to widen the scope of 
enquiry, moving away from a simplistic billiard ball model. As such, there is great 
promise in proposing a truly systemic exploration of the international system. 
However, just as Neorealism effectively reduces explanation to unit-level analysis, 
there is an inherent danger that Neoliberals might end up doing the same. Despite the 
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promise of a story that seems to take seriously the complex nature of the international 
system, the entangled web of interactions remains underutilized. Put differently, if and 
when a proponent of this story needs to decide who the most influential actor might 
be, there is not much choice but to favour states over other actors. Hence, while an 
exploration into First- and Second Images are always possible in this story, the default 
position remains the Third Image. 
 
 
Story Three: The Web of Social Interactions 
 
So far we have seen two stories that are more or less focused on the role of state 
actors. They differ from one another in that the first story provided very much a top-
down view of the world that depicted international system as a billiard ball model, on 
the one hand; while the second story provided a picture of the international system in 
which international regimes acted as a market for national interests, on the other. The 
first story was less interested in domestic dynamics, focusing instead on the states as 
rational egotists. In contrast, the second story created a space for other actors, 
including MNCs and individuals, to be considered as influencing international affairs. 
However, once we take a step back, they seem to share a common trait: that states are 
the most influential actors on the international stage. Indeed, it is interesting to see 
Keohane (1988: 312) arguing that system level theories, including Neorealism and 
Neoliberalism, do not pay ‘sufficient attention to domestic politics’. This a striking 
comment, as Keohane—one of the main proponents of the second story—is arguing 
to move back from the Third- to Second-, if not the First Image analysis. 
 The third story of the international system seeks to address Keohane’s critique. 
While maintaining some element of systemic analysis, this story also provides a 
conceptual tool for IR theorists to take domestic politics into consideration. This story 
seeks to do this by considering the international system as a macro-level social 
interaction. Compared to the billiard ball analogy of the First Story, the international 
system in the Third Story is much more complex. Instead of considering the state to 
be an innate black box akin to an automaton, the Third Story treats states as 
intentional actors who are engaged in social interactions, comparable to individuals 
within human society. One major proponent of this story, Alexander Wendt (1999: 
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217), suggests that states and societies ‘have a collective dimension that causes 
macro-level regularities among their elements … over space and time’. As such, we 
are looking at potentially a very complex theory of the international system. 
 In treating the international system as a macro-level social sphere, the 
proponents of the third story, namely Constructivists, make the following 
assumptions: 
 
• Just like human interaction within communities and societies, meanings are 
important 
• Actors are assumed to be intentional, not just rational. This means that actors 
have identities and use symbolisms in their interactions 
• Actors could be states, groups, or individuals, thereby opening the way for an 
even more complex analysis of the international system than the second story 
 
The main concern for 
Constructivists has less to do 
with the appropriate levels of 
analysis as it is to do with the 
nature of the international 
system more generally. In 
other words, the third story is concerned about the social context of the international 
system. 
 Take our everyday social context. In our relationships, we have friends and 
foes. We sort of know how it feels to be with friends—it differs from how it feels to 
be with our nemeses. But the most important thing is this: friendship or foe depends 
primarily on how we interact with other individuals. In other words, friendship is one 
form of social context; we act towards our friends in a particular way, because that is 
the ‘right thing’ for us to do; and we expect our friends to act towards us in a 
particular way as well. In short, we have identities as friends; and that contextualizes 
the interaction (= friendship) into a particular social dynamic. 
 Constructivists model the international system in a similar way. Instead of 
friends and foes, we can substitute allies and enemies. States, for instance, have a very 
good idea of who the allies are, and who the potential enemies might be. Unlike the 
Constructivism: A theoretical approach in 
which actors’ perceptions, ideas, images, and 
symbols are taken seriously. Borrows heavily 
from Social Theory and Philosophy of 
Language. 
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Neorealist international system where everyone else is a potential enemy, the 
proponents of the third story suggest that allies and enemies are the products of 
socialization—how states have behaved toward one another over time. States expect 
allies to act in a particular way, invoking collective defence when an ally comes under 
fire (see Chapter 13). Wendt (1999: 97) suggests that the structure of the international 
system is all about ideas; and he suggests that ‘history matters’ because it is through 
history that precedents create meanings for a particular international context (Wendt, 
1999: 109). 
 The logical conclusion to this is that the Constructivists consider the anarchic 
structure of the international system to be a social construct. This is in stark contrast 
to the Neorealist assumption that anarchy is the defining feature of the international 
system. Wendt (1992: 395) argues that 
‘self-help and power politics are 
institutions, not essential features of 
anarchy. Anarchy is what states make of 
it’, just as friendship relies on friends 
sustaining that relationship. Hence, 
Constructivism provides a significant 
corrective to the first story: there is 
nothing deterministic about the 
international system; and that actors are not billiard balls, but rather, intentional actors, 
just as individuals in society have intentions. For instance, Waltz’s use of market 
analogy to show that actors are rational egotists is criticized for failing to appreciate 
that markets themselves are social constructions, relying heavily on participants’ 
intentions (Kratochwil, 1989: 47). Furthermore, there is also a critique of the second 
story. John Ruggie (1998: 63) argues that, while the Neoliberals’ attention to 
international regimes is useful, their analyses are inadequate, given that the success or 
failure of regimes also depends ‘by the intentionality and acceptability others attribute 
to those acts in the contexts of an intersubjective framework of meaning’. 
 In this story, individual human decisions are as important as the analysis of 
what states do at collective levels. States might remain one of the main actors; but 
Constructivists are ready to pay close attention to other actors such as individuals and 
groups. In that sense, the third story has moved on from the Third Image to the other 
images. Also, it seems as if this story is concerned with all three levels of decision 
Social Construct: any ‘thing’ 
which exists by virtue of humans 
reproducing its concept. Intangible 
‘things’ such as ‘society’ and ‘state’ 
are good examples of social 
constructions. While social 
constructs might seem like figments 
of people’s imaginations, they 
nevertheless impact on humans by 
affecting the way we behave. 
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making. Again, there are parallels to Allison’s three levels, as Constructivists pay 
close attention to what individuals and groups do. This story recognizes that groups 
and other macro-level social actors such as the state, MNCs, non-governmental 
organizations, bureaucracies, and society, are all made of individuals acting in their 
respective roles within various levels. Put differently, the Constructivists are 
cognisant of the fact that social actors are layered actors comprised of: 
 
• Individuals with their identities and personal beliefs and backgrounds (see 
Chapter 6); 
• These individuals come together to form groups, including various levels of 
decision making in governments and other organizations; and 
• These individuals and groups make individual- and collective decisions in the 
name of the organizations that they represent (Wight, 2006). 
 
In other words: individuals (presidents, prime ministers, company executives) come 
together to form an executive branch; the executives deliberate on a policy; and 
particular individuals vested with particular roles and decision making powers within 
the executive (President John F. Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis or Steve 
Jobs deciding on the design of iPhones) make decisions that represent the collective 
decision of the organization.  
 To be sure, the third story is not fully compatible with the Three Images or the 
levels of analysis precisely because it is more concerned with the web of interaction 
between and among the individuals and groups. Put differently, Constructivism is 
interested in: 
 
• How states, as complex social entities, interact with one another; 
• How ideas shape the world; 
• How individuals with their identities and biases come together and negotiate 
an outcome as a group; and 
• How individuals and social entities ‘think’ about the world. 
 
Hence, the third story is not ‘structural’ in that it is not only interested in states as 
billiard balls; nor is it necessarily interested in focusing on the groups and individuals. 
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Instead, the third story tells a very complex story of the international system that is 
starting to resemble stories about society and our day-to-day experiences. To that 
extent, Constructivists do not necessarily subscribe to the neat delineation of Three 
Images nor the three levels of decision making. 
 
 
The Critique 
 
From the perspective of the third story, both the first- and second stories treat states 
and other actors as lacking intentions, and as a result, they resemble automatons. This 
is problematic for Constructivists since there is nothing deterministic about the way 
the international system ‘works’. Furthermore, given the Constructivists’ interest in 
identities as a source of actor interests, the Neorealist- and Neoliberal penchant for 
interests as things that are predetermined by the structure of the international system 
becomes an issue. Simultaneously, the Constructivist assumption that social actors are 
layered actors enables a smoother transition from one level of analysis to another. 
 What sets the third story apart from the first two is its attention to intangibles, 
such as ideas and intentions. On the one hand, this is a definite plus, as our daily 
experiences are full of intangibles, such as meanings we attach to our actions. We are 
able to distinguish between the subtle nuances in our daily lives; and even within the 
international system, there are subtleties in the form of ambiguities that govern the 
way state actors interact with one another. The American ‘pivot’ back to the Asia-
Pacific might be another instance of a social context full of meanings and symbolisms. 
Is rising China a threat? If so, then the US intentions might be to contain China. If 
China is not a threat, then how are we to understand US intentions? Is Washington 
jealously trying to maintain its hegemonic power? It is primarily a case of ‘where you 
stand depends on where you sit’; and the Constructivists take this very seriously. 
 However, the third story is extremely complex. As a model for analyzing the 
international system, it involves guess work—guessing what the various actions mean. 
It does not help that one of the main proponents of this story, Wendt (1999: Chapter 
3), is uncertain whether or not the international structure is comprised of ‘ideas all the 
way down’. From the perspective of the first two stories, there is a question of how 
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‘scientific’ this story really is (Keohane, 1988: 392). Perhaps this is an unfair critique, 
but it is an issue that needs to be addressed by those who subscribe to this story. 
 
 
Story Four: International System as a Story 
 
The three stories thus far shared some similarities while being distinct in their own 
ways. On the one hand, the first two stories focused mainly on the system-level 
analysis exploring how actors—both state- as well as non-state—behave in an 
anarchic international system. On the other hand, the third story emphasized that the 
international system is akin to a macro-level social interaction in which social actors, 
large and small, interact with one another; and in analyzing such a complex web of 
social interaction, we need to move up and down the various levels of analysis. As 
such, the three stories operate at particular points on the levels of analysis as a 
framework for understanding the way international system operates. 
 The fourth story is radically different. It is highly critical of the preceding 
stories. Critical in a sense that it engages with the three stories, ‘takes apart’ the logic 
of these stories, and seeks to unravel the ‘hidden meanings’. For theorists accustomed 
to the three stories, the fourth one makes for a very uncomfortable reading; but these 
criticisms are worth exploring. As for the levels of analysis, it is seen as just one of 
many stories we might tell about the world. But the fourth story also tells us that there 
are many other stories to be told 
about international life. It is for this 
reason that this story is truly critical. 
 The main theme of the fourth 
story is metaphor. What is meant 
here is that social reality is 
constituted of symbols, language, 
performance, and other forms of 
representations, as opposed to the 
‘certainty’ of the existence of the 
state or the international system as a 
‘thing’ to be analyzed. Put 
Metaphor: a figure of speech in which a 
word is used to describe something it 
does not literally mean (Blackburn 1994: 
240). 
 The phrase, the ‘Axis of Evil’, 
used by President George W. Bush in 
January 2002 to describe Iraq, Iran, and 
North Korea is an example of metaphor 
in practice. Some IR Theorists consider 
the notion of unitary state as a metaphor 
as well, given that a state is a social 
construct—a product of human 
interactions. 
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differently, the fourth story has problems with whatever is meant by the ‘state’, the 
‘international system’, ‘national interests’, and so on. This story is concerned less 
with how to provide a ‘scientific’ understanding of international politics, as it is 
concerned primarily with the ways in which we use language and ideas to explain and 
represent our international experience. It is, by definition, critical: it is critical because 
this story seeks to unravel the ‘common sense’ that seems to permeate within the three 
previous stories about the need to prioritize states and their behaviours. 
 Hence, one of the levels of analysis, the state, ceases to be as clear-cut an 
entity as it was in the first two stories. Even the more complex formulation of the state 
as a complex social entity does not escape criticism. Iver Neumann (2004: 260) takes 
issues with such formulations, suggesting instead that we should treat states as 
discursive constructions—or metaphors—accusing Wendt and others of 
‘prorgrammatically reifying social phenomena’. For him, treating states as complex 
social entities, let alone things to be analyzed, ‘seems to constrain rather than to 
enable our inquiry into what is happening to states and their place in global politics 
here and now’ (Neumann, 2004: 267). Thus, the proponents of the fourth story are 
insinuating that states are not so much ‘things out there’, but rather a set of symbols 
and meanings that change from time to time. Put differently, they are arguing that 
states are not things we ‘analyze’ but they are things we ‘talk about’. To say that 
states—and other things in international relations—are metaphors provides potentials 
for transformation: changes in the way we alter our interpretations about, and 
meanings we attach to, concepts in IR such as states potentially transform our 
understanding of them. Consequently, just as we are interested in the various stories 
we tell about the levels of analysis of the international system, the proponents of this 
story consider ideas about states to be another set of stories. 
 In a further critique of the Constructivist depiction of the international system 
as a complex web of social relations, 
Roxanne Lynn Doty (1997: 376) argues 
that it should be treated not as a 
constellation of state actors interacting 
with one another in a social context, but 
rather, as a set of practices. She suggests 
that the concern with tangible entities 
The fourth story is often told by 
theorists belonging to 
Poststructuralism or 
Postmodernism in IR Theory. 
While these labels might be 
inaccurate, it is important to 
remember their common 
approach to IR: the primacy of 
language in the way we 
understand the world. 
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such as the state and the international system prevents us from telling stories that are 
based on meanings and practices. She argues that practice is ‘inextricably connected 
to the production of meanings’, since it is more fruitful to consider the international 
system as sets of practices rather than overlapping layers. For her, the international 
system is a set of practices that are ‘embedded in discourse(s) which enable particular 
meaning(s) to be signified’ (Doty, 1997: 377). In this formulation, the international 
system becomes less of a structured realm where actors at various levels interact with 
one another, but more as a set of meanings that change over time. Doty (1997: 385) 
notes that, ‘[w]hat becomes sayable, doable, imaginable within a society results from 
a process of discursive repetition and dissemination’. This includes our stories about 
the international system: Doty (Ibid.) posits that ‘the issues of agency and structure(s) 
cannot be adequately or critically examined without also examining representational 
practices’. 
 In a similar vein, foreign policy is treated in a significantly different manner. 
Instead of approaching foreign policy as sets of decision making processes that can be 
analyzed from various levels, the proponents of the fourth story identify elements of 
meanings and practices that are inherent in it. David Campbell (1998: 69) argues that 
foreign policy is the ‘constant (re)construction of identity through the strategy of 
otherness’, that it is a ‘discourse of power that is global in scope yet national in 
legitimation’(Campbell, 1998: 70). Hence, Campbell is suggesting that foreign policy 
is less an outcome of decision making against which the levels of analysis approach 
can be applied, as it is a set of practices and meanings about national identities as well 
as a shared sense of danger as a result of historic practice. In short, foreign policy is 
about understanding ‘who we are’, and ‘whom we are against’. For him, ‘it is the 
objectification of the self through the representation of danger that Foreign Policy 
helps achieve’ (Campbell, 1998: 71). Hence, in addition to Doty’s preoccupation with 
practice, Campbell is concerned about shifting worldviews that give rise to the notion 
of us versus them. The main focus of the 
fourth story ceases to revolve around 
how we conceptualize the relationship 
between the actor and the international 
system; but rather, the primary aim is to 
critique the ‘language’ of ‘talking about’ 
The main message of the fourth 
story is this: the international 
order, as we know it today, is an 
accident of history. Hence, 
concepts such as the ‘state’ and 
the notion of ‘sovereignty’ are 
products of particular events in 
history. 
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states and the international system. Subtle though this may seem, such distinction 
becomes crucial in appreciating the fourth story. 
 Hence, the fourth story is quite subversive. On the surface, this story refuses to 
engage with the other three. Yet, it is also the case that this story recognizes an 
important point: however much other stories seek to provide a more definitive tool for 
analyzing the international system, they remain stories that one can decide whether or 
not to adopt. By extension, the levels of analysis considerations remain another set of 
stories that people tell about international relations: the choice of Waltzian First-, 
Second-, or Third Image is really about a choice of stories with which one wants to 
engage. The first two stories focused on the role of states within the international 
system; but they remain only two of many stories we can tell, however much this way 
of telling about the world has been the most dominant of stories (Walker, 1993: 126). 
R.B.J. Walker (1993: 154-55) notes that, ‘[s]tates, it is often observed, have not 
disappeared. Nor have they lost their capacity to deploy violence on a frightening 
scale. But this says very little about the continuing capacity of states to resolve the 
contradiction between citizenship and humanity through claims to absolute authority’. 
For Walker (1993: Chapter 5), if territorial sovereignty is the defining element of the 
international system, it is because this is simply an accident of history. If the levels of 
analysis are seen to be pertinent to our understanding of how the world ‘works’, again, 
it is because we are made to think so. In essence, the fourth story seeks to demonstrate 
that there are many more stories waiting to be told about how the world ‘works’. 
 
The Critique 
 
The fourth story differs significantly from the previous three stories in its approach to 
the international system and to the levels of analysis. This story provides a dramatic 
critique of the other stories, unravelling the subtle biases and exposing the inherent 
assumptions underlying each of the other stories. To this extent, the fourth story is 
very subversive; and its readiness to admit that we are all telling stories about the 
international system is revealing. This story provides us with a further set of tools to 
critically reassess other stories and question their underlying assumptions. In other 
words, this story equips us with a critical ‘tool box’ to deconstruct any story anyone is 
telling about the way the international system ‘works’. 
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 If anything, this story is inconclusive. It is one thing for us to appreciate that 
we are all telling stories. It is quite another for us to simply suggest that other theories 
are stories. While we can appreciate that we are telling stories about whatever 
concerns us on the international stage, this story prevents us from asking questions 
such as ‘how would Iran respond to US sanctions?’; or ‘what is the role of identity 
politics in the Arab-Israeli conflict?’ Yes, they are stories, after all; but it is not at all 
clear whether reducing everything down to stories might help us in exploring 
whatever international events that make us curious. To be sure, stories are important, 
and we all engage in story-telling; but it is also the case that we tell stories with a 
particular aim of explaining or understanding the complexities of the international 
system. We tell stories because we have intentions to try to engage with what is 
happening around the world. This is an important thing that must not be overlooked.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The levels of analysis provide us with a useful starting point for the study of 
international politics. It is a versatile methodological tool that allows us to appreciate 
various factors affecting decision making processes. The levels of analysis enable us 
to ask questions about how foreign policy decisions are made, or how international 
conflicts emerge. Furthermore, moving back and forth among the various levels 
enables us to understand how each of the levels interacts with one another. While the 
proponents of the levels of analysis approach might have preferences over which 
levels to prioritize, this way of looking at IR makes us more aware of the complexities 
of the reality of international life. 
 However, there are limits as to whether we can adopt the levels of analysis 
approach to the study of the international system. The main reason for this is that the 
international system itself is one of the levels of analysis—whether be it the study of 
international conflicts or foreign policy decision making. Given the usefulness of this 
approach, having an enhanced set of tools for the study of the international system 
would be beneficial. As seen in previous chapters, there are many perspectives on the 
way world politics evolved over time and space (Chapter 1), as well as many different 
ways of theorizing about it (Chapter 2). Taking multiple perspectives further enables 
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us to think about stories we might tell about the international system. Some of the 
stories are amenable to the levels of analysis approach, while others might be 
fundamentally at odds with it. To the extent that the levels of analysis also tell stories 
about how foreign policy decisions are made, or how international conflicts come 
about, we can tell stories about the international system itself. In short, the stories we 
tell represent how we ‘hook up to the world’ (Jackson, 2011: xii; xiii), precisely 
because we need to tell particular stories about the complex realities of the 
international system due to our limited conceptual capacities (Jackson, 2011: Chapter 
1). 
 As stated above, one of the 
benefits of the levels of analysis 
approach is that they enable us to 
take variations in the way we can 
depict international actors seriously. 
While we do need to be mindful of 
their interactions with the systemic 
constraints of the international political environment, once we are aware of the 
benefits and limits of the levels of analysis approach, we can better appreciate what 
the actors are thinking, how they might behave within the international system, and 
the effects their actions might have on the outcomes of world politics. 
 
 
Questions for Reflection 
 
1. What are the pros and cons of the levels of analysis approach? 
2. What are the main characteristics of the first story? 
3. What is the main difference between the second- and first stories? 
4. What is meant by treating the international system as a macro-level social 
interaction? 
5. What are the pros and cons of the fourth story? 
 
 
Revision Quiz 
Patrick Jackson (2011) is implying that 
the story we—as students of 
International Relations—decide to tell 
is primarily determined by how we 
understand our complex world. There 
is no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ story; and the 
task for us is to try to tell a convincing 
story about our observations and 
experiences. 
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Q1. What is Waltz’s Third Image? 
(a) The State 
(b) Ideology 
(c) Political leaders 
(d) The international system 
Q2. What is Allison’s second level of analysis? 
(a) The state 
(b) Ideology 
(c) Bureaucracy 
(d) The international system 
Q3. What role do international institutions play? 
(a) Conduct wars 
(b) Resolve wars 
(c) Act as a ‘market place’ 
(d) Not much 
Q4. What factor is considered most important by Realists? 
(a) Power 
(b) Cooperation 
(c) International institutions 
(d) Norms 
Q5. Which level of analysis does Waltz think is most important? 
(a) The state 
(b) The individual 
(c) Bureaucracy 
(d) The international system 
Q6. Do the proponents of fourth story subscribe to the levels of analysis approach? 
(a) Yes 
(b) No 
Q7. Do Constructivists subscribe to the levels of analysis approach? 
(a) Yes, definitely 
(b) Yes, to an extent that the international system is complex 
(c) Yes, to the extent that it is preoccupied with foreign policy 
(d) Definitely not 
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Q.8. Which level of analysis does Robert Jervis say is most important? 
(a) The individual 
(b) The bureaucracy 
(c) The international system 
(d) All levels are important in international politics 
Q9. What do the first- and second Stories agree on? 
(a) The role of individuals 
(b) The role of international institutions 
(c) The role of states 
(d) The role of MNCs 
Q10. The fourth story believes in one true story 
(a) True 
(b) False 
 
Answers: 1 (d); 2 (c); 3 (c); 4 (a); 5 (d); 6 (No); 7 (b); 8 (d); 9 (c); 10 (False) 
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